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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
EMPLOYEES OF rT ... -\.H FFEL CtHIPANY ) 
AT CLEAR CREEK. rT.AH, ) 
Petitione-rs, ) 
vs. 
THE INDrSTRUL CO)IMISSIOX OF 
l:TAH. and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
UTAH FUEL COMP.A...,Y, a corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brief of 
Petitioners 
The petitione-rs at all times herein mentioned have been 
employees of the Utah Fuel Company at its mine at and near 
Clear Creek, Carbon County, Utah. 
In the month of :May, 1939, petitioners filed applications 
before The Industrial Commission of the State of Utah for 
unemployment compensation for a period beginning on the 5 
day of May, 1939, and ending on the 18 day of May, 1939, 
both dates inclusive. Said proceedings were entitled by The 
Industrial Commission as Claims No. 39-A-70 and No. 39-C-22. 
In decisions dated May 22, 1939, and June 17, 1939, respec-
tively, the Claims Section of the Department of Placement 
and Unemployment Insurance of The Industrial Commission 
of Utah, rendered its decision "that a stoppage of work ex-
isted because of a general strike occurring in the bituminous 
coal industry of the state of Utah", "that such stoppage of 
work existed from midnight May 4 to midnight May 18, 1939, 
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2 
and that such stoppage of work resulted from a strike foment-
ed by the workers" and that pE'titioners herein were involved 
in said strike, which it was claimed, was the reason that they 
were unemployed during the period in question. 
From the Initial Determination of the matter an appeal 
was filed June 22, 1939, by the employees (petitioners herein) 
of the Utah Fuel Company at Clear Creek to the Appeal 
Tribunal. On the 11 day of July, 1939, the Appeal Tribunal 
granted the application of petitioners herein for unemploy-
ment compensation. On the 27 day of July, 1939, applica-
tion for a rehearing was filed by the Utah Fuel Company and 
on the 14 day of August, 1939, The Industrial Commission of 
Utah, without granting petitioners herein a hearing, merely 
reversed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal and denied 
applicants any unemployment compensation for the period 
in question. On the 23 day of August, 1939, petitioners 
herein filed with the said Industrial Commission their '' Mo-
tion for Reconsideration of Decision or a New Trial", and 
on the 13 day of October, 1939, said motion was denied. 
The defendant, Utah Fuel Company, has resisted the 
granting of an award of unemployment compensation to peti-
tioners herein under the provisions of subsection (d) and sub-
section (d) ( 1) of Section 5 of the Unemployment Compensa-
tion law, (Laws of Utah 1936, Special Session, Chapter 1, 
Section 5, Subsection (d), Subsection (d) (1) ), and contended 
that petitioners herein are ineligible for benefits during the 
period in question because their unemployment was due to a 
stoppage of work which existed because of a strike. 
Said subsection (d) and subsection (d) (1), of Section 
5 of the Unemployment Compensation law, insofar as they 
could apply to this case, are as follows: 
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"Disqualification for bent>tits. An individnnl shall be 
ineligible- for be-ne-fits: 
.. (d) For <Hl . '" week in w hit'l1 it is t\nulll hy tIll' 
commission that his total or pnrtinl mwmploymt>nt is dut' 
to a stoppage of work whieh exists ht'L'tlllSt' of a st1·ikt' 
inYolving his grade. elnss. or group of wtwlu~rs at thl' 
factorv or establishment at whiL'h he is or was lnst t'm-
ployed .. , 
"(1) If the commission. upon investig-ation. shall 
find that a strike has been fonll~nted b~- a worker of any 
employer. none of the workers of the grade, class, or 
group of workers of the individual who is foun~ to be a 
party to such plan. or agreement to foment a strtke. shall 
be eligible for benefits; pronded. however, that if the 
commission. upon investigation. shall find that such 
strike is caused by the failure or refusal of any em-
ployer to conform to the provisions of any law of the 
state of Ltah or of the rnited States pertaining to hours, 
wages or other conditions of work, such strike shall not 
render the workers ineligible for benefits.'' 
The only record of testimon~- is that taken at the hear-
ing before the Appeals Examiner. Both sides were present 
and introduced endence in support of their respective claims. 
We believe the record will show that before any applica-
tions for compensation were filed by petitioners herein and 
employees of other coal companies in the State of Utah, the 
employers had submitted certain matters to The Industrial 
Commission representing that all employees in the coal in-
dustry, who were members of the United Mine Workers of 
America, were on strike during the period in question. 
Subsection (b) of Section 6 of the Unemployment Com-
pensation law provides, among other things, that when claims 
for benefits have been made ''a deputy or representative 
designated by the commission-shall promptly examine the 
claim and, on the basis of the facts found by him, shall either 
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4 
determine whether or not such claim is valid-or refer such 
claim to the appeal tribunal-except that in any case in which 
the payment or denial of benefits will be determined by the 
provisions of section 5 (d) of this act, the deputy shall 
promptly transmit his full findings of fact with respect to 
that subsection to the commission which, on the basis of 
evidence submitted and such additional evidence as it may 
require, shall affirm, modify or set aside such findings of 
fact and transmit to the deputy a decision upon the issues 
involved under that subsection which shall be deemed to be 
the decision of the deputy.'' 
So far as petitioners know no hearing was held or in-
vestigation made of petitioners' applications prior to the 
"Initial Determination" of the matter. 
Thereafter The Industrial Commission as a whole, we 
assume after an investigation and possibly upon representa-
tions of employers, as hereinabove set forth, rendered a 
blanket decision declaring all members of the United Mine 
Workers of America ineligible for benefits on the theory that 
they were "on strike". Said decision applied to petitioners 
herein. Petitioners herein appealed to the Appeals Tribunal. 
We assume that that was the proper procedure under the 
law, in spite of the fact it does seem rather silly that an ap-
peal can be taken from the decision of The Industrial Com-
mission as a whole in the Initial Determination of the matter 
although said decision ''shall be deemed to be the decision 
of the deputy" in vierw of the fact that subsection (e) of said 
section 6 gives the commission the authority "on its own 
motion'' to ''affirm, modify or set aside any decision of an 
Appeal Tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously sub-
mitted in such case,'' etc. 
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A complete hearing of the east~ was had befort' tht' Ap-
peals Examiner. We bdieve that this was tht' only hearing 
had by petitioners on the facts which appl~· to them. 
After said hearing the Appt>als Exmnirwr rt'IHit'I"t'd a 
decision in favor of the applicants. whil'h said dt'eision upon 
appeal by the rtah Fuel Company was merely reversed by the 
commission without furtht>r evidence. Petitioners in support 
of a Motion for Reconsideration or a New Trial submitted 
a brief. which was answered by the Ftah Fuel Company. 
Said motion was likewise denied and this appeal taken. 
The Industrial Commission in its first ·'Decision and 
Order" rendered in the Initial Determination of the matter 
made certain findings of fact. Petitioners do not know what 
evidence was submitted to the commission enabling it to make 
said findings. They~ howe-ver, do not seriously disagree with 
the facts set out in said findings of fact but do seriously dis-
agree with the arguments made and conclusions drawn by the 
commission in said '·Decision and Order.'' 
No evidence was introduced before the Appeals Tribunal 
on most of the matters co-vered by said ''findings of fact''. 
We are rather at a loss to decide under said Unemployment 
Compensation law whether this Court can and should take 
into consideration the said findings of fact of the commis-
sion in the Initial Determination of the matter, which was a 
blanket decision affecting practically all employees in the 
state, including petitioners herein, or whether the evidence 
submitted before the Appeals Tribunal should be considered 
by this Court as the only evidence involved. We will discuss 
the matter further, later in this brief. 
It is contended by petitioners herein that The Industrial 
Commission of Utah committed error, as follows: 
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6 
(a) Because its decision that petitioners are in-
eligible for benefits during the period in question, under 
the claim that they were on a strike, is illegal and is not 
sustained by the evidence; 
(b) Because said decision is contrary to law; 
(c) Because said decision is not sustained by the 
evidence or any evidence that petitioners were unem-
ployed because of a strike, and that all of the evidence 
shows that petitioners were unemployed because there 
was no work for them and no work was offered them by 
said Utah Fuel Company during the period in question. 
The questions which it appears necessary to be decided 
by the Court, in addition to those raised in the paragraph just 
hereinabove, are as follows: 
1. Whether or not the ''Findings of Fact'' in the 
commission's first "Decision and Order" can be taken 
into consideration by this Court in rendering its decision 
in view of the fact that no evidence was submitted by 
either party before the Appeals Tribunal on most of the 
facts found? 
If the Findings of Fact rendered by the commission in 
its first Decision and Order can be taken into consideration 
by this Court, the question arises: 
(2) Whether or not employees who have a con-
tractual right with their employer to terminate a con-
tract upon certain conditions become ineligible for un-
employment compensation by doing only what their 
employer has contractually agreed with them that they 
might do? 
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ARGUMENT 
It is admitted by the defendants in this cast> that the 
claimants. (petitioners herein). are entitled to ha Vt' their ap-
plications granted unless they are ine-ligible to rert•ive benefits 
because of the provisions of S<lid subsections. In other words 
the Utah Fuel Company. as an affirmative defense, makes the 
claim that petitioners are ineligible to receive benefits because 
of facts bringing them within the provisions of said subsec-
tions 5 (d) and 5 (d) (1). 
The position of the rtah Fuel Company of necessity must 
be that the ''total-unemployment'' of the claimants was 
"due to a stoppage of work" which existed " because of a 
strike", etc., and that they are, therefore, ineligible for bene-
fits. 
The burden of proof is upon the Utah Fuel Company, 
who asserts it, to prove that the unemployment of the men 
was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a 
strike, etc. 
20 Am. Jur.-Evidence--Section 137: 
''The burden of proof in the true sense of the term 
is upon the defendant as to all affirmative defenses which 
he sets up in answer to the plaintiff's claim or cause of 
action, upon which issue is joined.'' 
See also case of Houtz v. Union P. R. Co., 33 Utah 
175, 193 P. 439, 17 L. R. A. (NS) 628. 
The first thing it must prove to sustain this burden is 
that the Utah Fuel Company a.t its Clear Creek mine actua.lly 
bad work available which it offered to the claimants and 
which was refused by them because they were on a strike. 
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There can be no dispute that the Utah Fuel Company 
did not request the men to work at any time during the period 
in question and the men did not refuse to work ':vhen asked. 
The defendant's superintendent in Clear Creek testified on 
cross examination that the men were not, asked at any time 
to work and did not at any time, refus.e to work. (Tr. p. 66). 
Tha,t testimony alone should be sufficient to make it 
manda,tory upon the commission to grant petitioners com-
pensation. 
The record shows witho·ut contradiction that the mme 
at Clear Creek was only worked by the company to meet the 
existing demand for coal. In other words, when orders for 
coal were received the mine worked. Without orders it did 
not work. There is no evidence that it had any orders at the 
time in question and its attorney refused to introduce evi-
dence that it did when the matter was called to his attention 
by the appeals examiner. (See Tr. p. 68). 
No witness testified that the mine would have worked 
had the employment contract not been terminated. As far 
as any of them would go and this includes their superintend-
ents was that it "probably would have". This is only a guess 
and is not evidence in support of the company's contention 
and upon which it has the burden of proof as above stated. 
The general superintendent testified for the Utah Fuel 
Company that there was a ''stimulated output'' of coal prior 
to May 4, 1939, in anticipation of a non-productive period 
after said date. (Tr. p. 50). He states further that "there is 
never any d.emand for coal that time of year"-(May 5, 1939) 
(Tr. p. 50)-and that he thinks it is right "that many" of the 
Utah Fuel Company's "big consumers in the State of Utah" 
had by May 5, 1939, ''laid in a supply of coal sufficient to 
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last them for sixty dn~·s ... (Tr. p. 51). The only pn'stuup-
tion that can be drawn from snid testimony of the Utah .F'ltl'l 
Company, especially as there is no evidenet' to the eontrary, 
is that the company had s-ufficient eoal on hand to IlH'd all 
orders, if it had any. and that the mine would not have OJWI"-
ated regardless of a termination of the contraet. 
The gener-al superintendent further h'stified that there 
"most assuredly would have been so little work that the men 
would have been entitled at least to partial unemployment 
compensation.·· (Tr. p. 53). 
How many days the mine would have worked during the 
period in question is a matter of pure guess as there was no 
evidence introduced concerning it. The men were not asked to 
work any days and were not to the date of the hearing. Men 
cannot refuse to work without being asked and they cannot 
strike from work when none exists. 
We believe that the intent of the law is that the hearing 
before the Appeals Examiner is a hearing de novo. The pur-
pose of the legislature in providing for an Initial Determina-
tion of claims was to take care of the great mass of applica-
tions as expeditiously as possible. It was not its intent that 
any record of testimony be taken and kept and that such 
Initial Determination be in any sense a trial. The purpose of 
having an Appeals Tribunal is to provide for a hearing in 
those cases in which contests arise ; both sides submit their 
evidence and a record of evidence is kept. It is then possible 
to determine upon what evidence, if any, the Appeals Ex-
aminer and later the commission based their respective deci-
sions. We believe that the only evidence on record that can 
be taken into consideration by this Court is what was intro-
duced before the Appeals Examiner, a record of which is 
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before said Court. If we are correct in our interpretation of 
the law most of the matters set forth in the findings of fact 
in the first Decision and Order of the commission cannot be 
considered. 
The Uta;h Fuel Company did not introduce any evidence 
of the termination of any contract at the hearing before the 
Appeals Examiner and it introduced no evidence whatever 
as to why it claimed that the petitioners herein did not work. 
All of the evidence and the only evidence introduced is to 
the effect that the men were not asked to work, did not refuse 
to work, that there was no work for them and that the com-
pany did not intend for them to work. 
It is certainly an unwarranted conclusion of fact to find, 
in the absence of supporting evidence, that the mine would 
have worked during the period in question if notice of termina-
tion of a contract had not been given. The' Utah Fuel Com-
pany does not even claim that the mine would have worked 
so much that the men would not have been entitled to partial 
unemployment compe·nsation as is the effeCit of the present 
decision of the commission. 
The claimants in this case have claimed at all times, that 
no offer of work was made to them which was refused and 
that the decision rendered in the initial determination of the 
matter could not apply to them because they never refused 
any employment when offered. 
All of the evidence submitted by both sides shows that 
no offer of work during the period in question was made to 
the petitioners and that they did not refuse to accept any 
work and could not have refused because none was offered. 
The Utah Fuel Company does not claim that it offered work 
to the claimants during the period involved, or if it did, it 
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failed to present eveil a scintilla of evidence to that efft•et. 
We find ourselves in the position in which all of the evidt•rwe 
on the question involved is one way, and that way is against 
the l'tah Fuel Company and in favor of the petitioners. 
It is not true that the ··Testimony introduced by employ-
er was definitely to the effect that work ceased l\Iay 4th be-
cause of a strike by members of the l"nited l\Iine Workers of 
America. and on cross examination this fact was admitted by 
Alfred Carey. District Board Member. District Four.'' 
Alfred Carey while being cross examined by 1\Ir. Binch 
on the contract which expired on March 31, 1939, the exten-
sion contract and the fifteen days' notice answered, "That is 
correct," to the question. •· And that is the time that work 
ceased of a productive nature in the mine, is it not Y I say 
all productive work ceased by reason of that order on mid-
night May fourth.''-'"That is all." (Tr. p. 11). 
This testimony was given by the witness on what he 
thought was the general condition throughout the district 
and was not intended specifically to apply to conditions in 
Clear Creek. The testimony at most, is merely a conclusion, 
which it is the sole prerogative of the Appeals Examiner and 
commission to draw, if supported by evidence, which it is 
not. It was further intended as the day the mine ceased oper-
ating and not the reason. 
We will hereafter discuss and refer to the testimony pre-
sented in arguing and support of our contention, and to see 
what is the proper conclusion to be drawn from the testimony 
presented. 
The evidence is conclusive that the place in which the men 
involved had been working, prior to May 4th, was practically 
worked out and that the coal was all but exhausted. The 
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petitioners' witness, Carey, testified that he had a conversa-
tion with Mr. W. D. Bryson, General Superintendent of the 
Utah Fuel Company, on May 4, in which Mr. Bryson told the 
witness as follows: "You are well aware of the condition 
at Clear Creek with regard to the district you are working 
in. It is practically worked out"; that the Utah Fuel Com-
pany "contemplated putting in some heavy steel into a par-
ticular entry into coal they wanted to develop; they also 
wanted to load some rock in that particular section and also 
stated that they contemplated remodeling the tipple and a 
lot of other miscellaneous matters which he stated to me was 
purely construction work". (Tr. p. 6). 
Petitioners' witness, Llewelyn, testified that the place 
that "they were working then had about gotten to the point 
where it was worked out," and that the coal had become so 
nearly exhausted that "the last three days we worked there 
were three or four men running around loading up bug-dust'' 
-"to get the day's work in." (Tr. p. 15). 
Mr. W. D. Bryson, the General Superintendent of the 
Utah Fuel Company, testified that he had a program tentative-
ly outlined for the coming summer and that ''it was substan-
tially what has been described by other witnesses". (Tr. p. 
40). He further testified that the coal in the place where 
the men were working "was nearing exhaustion but there 
was still coal to be mined." (Tr. p. 43). That he had reached 
his decision ''in the spring'' of this year ''to do the construc-
tion work that had to be done." And that "the construction 
work was work that was necessary and had to be done before 
very much more coal mining could be done." (Tr. p. 45). 
It may be that a little more coal could have been removed 
from the place that the men were working but there certainly 
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could not have been a da.y 's more work left as there were 
"three or four men running around loading up bug-dust-to 
get the day's work in". (Tr. p. 15). 
At the conversation between 1Ir. Bryson and 1\Ir. Carey on 
the 4: day of 1Iay. hereinabove referred to, 1\Ir. Bryson did 
not ask that the men work to produce coal. (Tr. p. 10). Ht> 
had been planning for some time to do the development work 
needed to be done and had decided to do it beginning with 
May 8th. 
The endence is conclusi\e that no work sign was put out 
notifying the men to come to work at any time after l\Iay 4 
as had been the custom of the company. Certain men who 
had been notified personally in the past when they were to 
work were not notified. 
The manner in which it is determined whether or not the 
Clear Creek mine would work on the following day is-'' As 
the orders come in from day to day, the order clerk of the 
sales department (in Salt Lake City) makes ·up a list of the 
coal orders he has for fulfilling in a day or two, and he sends 
those by teletype to the mine and says 'work'. Now, the 
superintendent of the local mine, the general superintendent, 
and the foreman know very little about what is back of the 
sales department." (Tr. p. 67). The mine superintendent 
at Clear Creek did not at any time receive a notice to work 
from the sales department in Salt Lake City, between May 5 
and May 18, 1939. This, in absence of proof of actual orders 
sufficient to work more than the Castle Gate mine, is con-
clusive evidence that there was no work of a productive 
nature for the claimants between May 5 and May 18, 1939, 
both dates inclusive. The company has not submitted any 
orders that it could not fill during the period in question. 
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The witness, Zane Nelson, testified that at the close of 
his shift, which was the night shift on May 3 he was instructed 
by R. D. Hansen, who was the night boss to "put tools in safe 
place. It may be some time before you use them again whether 
there is a strike or not.'' ''I hung up my tools and they are 
still hanging there." (Tr. p. 26). 
All of the railroad cars in which the coal is ordinarily 
placed after it is mined were moved from the camp on May 4, 
( Tr. p. 18), showing that the company had no intention of 
working the following day. 
On May 8 a committee representing the men called to see 
Mr. Thorpe, the mine superintendent, and asked him about 
how the development work would be divided up among the 
men. ''He said the work would be divided up among the 
inside and outside day men, and we asked 'How about the 
contract men?'' ''He stated 'they could go ahead and file 
claims for compensation.' " (Tr. p. 21-22). 
Thorpe did not tell them that if they would mine coal 
they could go to work on the next day. He just enumerated 
those who could work and told the others they had better 
apply for their unemployment compensation, which shows 
that the company had no intention of mining coal for some 
time even if the contract were not terminated. Mr. Thorpe 
does not deny that he told the men to go ahead and file their 
claims for compensation. He just says that "he does not re-
member''. The witnesses for the petitioners were positive on 
the matter. 
Mr. Thorpe, the mine superintendent, testified that the 
miners at Cle·ar Creek did not refuse to go to work because 
they were not asked and that they were not asked to work 
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a.nd mine cO&l a.fter the day shift went off work on the 4 
day of May up to and including May 18. (Tr. p. 57). 
Mr. Thorpe also further testified that when the pit com-
m.ittt>e representing the men came to see him on 1\Iny S, 19:~. 
the men were anxious to work. 
On May 11. the rnited .Mint> 'Vorkers of America Union 
submitted to the operators a proposed new employment con-
tract which was latt.>r accepted by the opt.>rators. If the Vtah 
Fuel Company could be correct in a claim that the men did 
not work between the 5 and the 11 beeause they terminated 
the contract then they certainly would be entitled to com-
pensation from the time they offered to sign the new one which 
was accepted. This would eliminate the period after the 11 
of May~ 1939. 
It is the contention of the claimants that the company 
did not intend to produce coal at Clear Creek after l\Iay 4. 
The testimony of Mr. Thorpe, the mine superintendent, rela-
tive to what happened during the time in question IS very 
illuminating. The following is a portion of it : 
(Tr. pages 63 and 64) 
Q. I am talking about your coal producing work. 
Didn't you contact :)Ir. Bryson after you found out, you 
say in the papers and all that sort of thing, that the union 
and the operators had come to some agreement, and that 
as far as the men were concerned they were willing and 
happy to go back to work-didn't you contact ::\Ir. Bry-
son to find out whether the mine was going to reopen or 
not? 
A. X ot as I recollect. 
Q. Why didn't you? You were told before, were 
you not, that the reason you weren't to work on the fifth 
was because the men had issued notice that they were 
going to have a stoppage of work effective midnight the 
fourth? Isn't that true? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Then you would naturally think, if that is the 
reason why your mine had stopped operating, then you 
would have to have some contact with your superiors 
when that condition ceased to exist to find out whether or 
not they wanted to start operations, wouldn't you? 
A. Well, it comes through the office, like I say. We 
didn't always get it from Mr. Bryson; he might be in 
some of the other mines. 
Q. Did you contact the office? 
A. The chief clerk takes care of that. 
Q. Did you contact the chief clerk? 
A. I spoke to him about it. 
Q. When did you speak to him about it? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Just to your best recollection. 
A. We spoke every night-somewhere around the 
fourtenth or the fifteenth. I wouldn't say because I 
really didn't keep track of it. 
Q. You weren't sure the fourteenth or the fifteenth 
that the stoppage of work had terminated, were you? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, I am asking you as soon as you found out 
that the union says, "allright, let's go back to work, the 
stoppage of work was terminated.'' Did you contact 
anybody in an official capacity superior to your own in 
the company for the purpose of finding out whether that 
mine was going to operate and produce coal? Did you? 
A. Well, there is no use in telling a lie. I don't 
recollect. I think the boss was up there. I just forget 
when he was up there because I don't keep track of him. 
I don't recollect it. 
Q. You don't recollect contacting any official of 
the company for the purpose of finding out whether the 
mine was going to resume coal producing operations, as 
soon as you found out any disagreement existing between 
the employees and the mine operators had terminated. 
You didn't do that. 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Were you advised by any of the mine officials in 
a superior capacity to your own at any time between, oh, 
the first of May and the eighteenth of May that the mine 
was not going to produce coal after the fourth-the day 
shift of the fourth? 
A. No. 
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Q. You were not so advised by any official of the 
company. 
A. No. 
We further wish to call to the Court's attt•ntion tha.t in 
the decision of the commission dated August 14 The Indus-
trial Commission found as a fact, that the Utah Fuel Com-
pany "directed the members" (some of petitioners herein) 
"of its night shift at 2 o'clock a.m., on May 4 to put up their 
tools and not to return to work on the following day". The 
commission then assumes to state the reason of the Utah Fuel 
Company for so directing said employees. We submit that the 
commission and the rtah Fuel Company have no right to 
assume that had they asked petitioners herein to go to work 
that petitioners would ha\e refused. An indispensable essen-
tial of a strike is a refusal to work. We challenge the Utah 
Fuel Company or The Industrial Commission to point out to 
this Court one word of testimony showing that petitioners 
herein refused employment when offered to them. It is fur-
ther very interesting to note that the Utah Fuel Company did 
not operate its mine beginning with the 18th of l\Iay, 1939, at 
which time it claimed the alleged strike terminated and it 
had not operated said mine or requested petitioners herein to 
work a single shift after May 4 up to and including the date 
of the hearing before the Appeal., Examiner, which was .July 
6, 1939. 
The Utah Fuel Company because of the lack of employ-
ment of petitioners, expected them to receive unemployment 
compensation as evidenced by the statement of their Super-
intendent Thorpe in telling petitioners that there was no work 
for them and to make application for their unemployment 
compensation. It developed later that there might be a 
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chance of defeating said claims, which is the reason for the 
company's action since. If it had thought on May 5, 1939, 
that the men were not entitled to unemployment compensa-
tion it would certainly have taken the added precaution of 
posting notices for ''work next day'' and notified those men 
to come to work that it had been customary to notify 
personally. 
We further wish to point out that in the commission's 
decision and order dated August 14, it states that the Utah 
Fuel Company ''may have, during the strike period con-
tinued in operation". There is nothing in the law which 
permits employees out of work, who are otherwise eligible, 
to be made ineligible just because a company ''may have-
continued in operation" but did not, especially in view of 
the fact that the company then guesses that if it did want to 
continue in operation that the men might have refused to 
work, if they had been asked, but they were not. The law 
does not permit claims to be denied on guesswork. The 
Utah Fuel Company claims that petitioners are ineligible 
because they were on strike. It must prove such a claim by 
something other than supposition and guesswork. 
The next question to be considered is whether or not 
employees who have a contractual right with their employer 
to terminate a contract upon certain conditions become ineli-
gible for unemployment compensation by doing only what 
their employer has contractually agreed with them that they 
might do. 
This question arises only if the findings of fact of the 
commission in its first Decision and Order can be considered 
by this Court in the absence of any record of evidence sup-
porting it. If it is the law that said findings of fact may be 
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taken as true. and eonsidered by this Court in rendering its 
decision, said question must be passed upon, but if it is not, 
said question in our judgment becomes moot. We, however, 
will discuss it. 
The findings of fact of the first Decision and Order show 
in part as follows : 
That no contract of employnwnt is entered into h<'-
tween the employers and emJ-)}oyees in etah Until the 
contract in the Central CompetitiYe Area has been con-
eluded. The contract in the Central Competitive Area, 
which is also referred to as the Appalachian Agreement, 
expired on 1Iareh 31. 1939. which was also the expiration 
date of the rtah contract. The rtah contract, howevPr, 
included the Section 103 set forth in said Decision and 
Order. Before the expiration date of the Utah contract, 
the employers and employees altered the provisions of 
Section 103, by providing for "the termination of work 
continued during the interim agreement, upon fifteen 
( 15) days' written notice." 
The reason for the modification of Section 103 was that 
both the employers and employees appreciated the fact that 
they could not negotiate or enter into a new contract until 
the Appalachian Agreement was completed. John L. Lewis 
and his associates were negotiating with the employers in 
that district. Both the employers and employees in Utah 
contemplated that a deadlock might develop in the Central 
Competitive Area, making it impossible for a contract to be 
entered into here and making it also impossible to negotiate 
a new contract. Both the employers and employees in Utah 
felt that they would wait upon the Central Competitive Area 
as long as reasonably possible, but when it became necessary 
to their best interest to cancel the interim agreement they 
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agreed that both employers and employees might do so upon 
giving fifteen days' written notice. 
The findings of fact show that the Utah employees had 
nothing whatever to do with giving said notice, or voice 
in the matter. They were ordered to do so, by their Inter-
national Executive Board, apparently because of the deadlock 
in the Central Competitive Area. 
As shown by the dissenting opinion of Commissioner 
Knerr, the employees of Utah are subordinate to the Inter-
national Executive Board and "Had the members of the local 
unions and employees of the operators in Utah failed to obey 
the positive mandate issued by their International Executive 
Board, they would have lost their standing with the organiza-
tion which might have disqualified them from ever regaining 
their membership in the United Mine Workers Union.'' 
The law contemplates that employees shall be penalized 
only when they are out of work through fault of their 
own. It is not contemplated by the law that such a situation 
as shown could be considered as the fault of the Utah em-
ployees. They were probably more anxious to work than 
was the employer to have them, but both sides were helpless. 
John L. Lewis and his group in effect constitute the collective 
bargaining agency for Utah coal miners, as well as the coal 
miners in the Central Competitive Area. It is to be noted 
that the employers in the Central Competitive Area refused 
to allow the employees to go on working under the same terms 
and conditions, which was the cause of the stoppage of work 
there, as well as in Utah. 
The Utah law contemplates that employees shall not be 
forced out of a union as a condition of employment. We call 
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the attention of the Court to Section 5 (c) ( 2) of the Act, 
which states in part, as follows: 
(e) (2) "Xotwithstnnding any other pronswn of 
this act. no work shall be lll't>IlH'd suitable and bl'Hefits 
shall not be denied under this al't to anv otherwise eli-
gible individual for refusing to accept n~w work under 
any of the following conditions:-( e) If as a condition 
of being emplo.red the individual would be reqnrsted to 
join a compan.r union or to resign from or refrain from 
joining any bona fide labor organizlltion. '' 
We appreciate the fact that said paragraph is not entirely 
in point but it shows the intent of the act. 
The employers in Utah would not enter into a contract 
with employees until the completion of the Appalachian con-
tract because it was necessary that the terms of said Appa-
lachian contract pertaining to wages, hours, etc.. be known 
first. 
The commission has apparently based its first Decision 
and Order upon the proposition that the employees by giving 
a notice of a termination of a contract render themselves 
ineligible. 
We submit that unemployment compensation should be 
granted employees upon a termination of a contract without 
regard to the reasons, providing the contract was legally 
terminated. If this is not done, it would be necessary for 
the court to inquire into the happenings of the bargaining 
agencies of both the employers and employees to determine 
who is the most stubborn or unreasonable, in determining 
whether employees are entitled to unemployment compensation. 
If the employees in Utah are to be bound by the acts of 
John L. Lewis and his group, certainly the employers in Utah 
should be bound by the acts of the employers in the Central 
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Competitive Area. If this is done and the situation viewed 
as a whole, only one conclusion can be arrived at, and that 
is, the employees in Utah were out of employment due to no 
fault of their own. 
Apparently there are no decisions of courts passing on 
the questions here involved. 
In summary we submit: 
1. That the1:e is no evidence to show that the Utah Fuel 
Company had any work for the claimants, (petitioners herein), 
during the period in question. 
2. That there is no evidence that the claimants, (peti-
tioners herein), were totally unemployed due to a stoppage 
of work which existed because of a strike. 
3. That if a strike existed in the coal mining industry 
there is no evidence to show that it was the cause or reason 
the claimants, (petitioners herein), did not work during the 
period in question. 
4. That the only evidence introduced shows without 
contradiction that the claimants, (petitioners herein), were 
not offered work or asked to work by the defendant, Utah 
Fuel Company, and that the claimants, (petitioners herein), 
did not refuse any offer or request by the Utah Fuel Company 
to work. 
5. That the Finding of Fact rendered by the commission 
in the Initial Determination of the matter cannot be taken 
into consideration by this Court in deciding this case. 
6. That employees who have a contractual right with 
their employer to terminate a contract upon certain condi-
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tion, by doing only what their employer has contractually 
agreed with them that they might do. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the claim-
ants, (petitioners herein). are clearly entitled to be awarded 
their unemplo~'lllent compensation for the period in question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARL D. GIBSON, 
Attorney for Petitioners. 
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